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The Political De-Determination of Legal Rules and the Contested Meaning of the 
µ1R%DLORXW¶&ODXVH 
 
Abstract 
Traditional debates on legal theory have devoted a great deal of attention to the question 
of the determinacy of legal rules. With the aid of social sciences and linguistics, this 
article suggests D ZD\ RXW RI WKH µGHWHUPLQDWH-LQGHWHUPLQDWH¶ dichotomy that has 
dominated the academic debate on the topic so far. Instead, a dynamic approach is 
proposedLQZKLFKUXOHVDUHGHHPHGWRXQGHUJRSURFHVVHVRISROLWLFDOµGH-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶
DQGµUH-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶7RLOOXVWUDWH this, the article uses the example of Art. 125 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ WKH µQR EDLORXW¶ SURYLVLRQ ZKLFK
played a major role in the management of the Euro-crisis. As will be shown, with the 
start of the crisis, this provision, whose meaning was once scarcely controversial, 
became the object of intense interpretative disagreement. As it became politically 
relevant, the rule also became the site of interpretative competitions, until the 
intervention of the European Court of Justice disambiguated and redefined its meaning. 
 
 
Key Words 
Art. 125 TFEU ± Euro-bailouts - Determinacy of Rules ± Law 
and Politics ± Juridical field 
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The Political De-Determination of Legal Rules and the Contested Meaning of the 
µ1R%DLORXW¶&ODXVH 
 
Introduction  
 
From 2009, the depth of an ever-increasing crisis in the Eurozone led to the creation of 
mechanisms of assistance for countries experiencing severe financial difficulties. 
Member States such as Ireland, Portugal and Greece, to note only a few examples, were 
the objects of so-FDOOHGµEDLORXWV¶, by which financial support was provided in exchange 
for profound, often socially contested, economic and political reforms. This idea of 
financial assistance was foreseen by Art. 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union1(TFEU) ± WKHµQREDLORXW¶FODXVH ± which in fact had gone relatively 
unnoticed before 2009. Legal literature in the pre-crisis period about the meaning and 
role of this rule in the general context of European Union economic governance had 
been scarce, at least in relation to its far-reaching political relevance (but see, inter alia, 
Hessel and Mortelmans, 1993; Herdegen, 1998: 26). Analyses had usually been limited 
to brief descriptions of the clause, suggesting that it prohibited bailouts within the 
8QLRQ ZLWKRXW IXUWKHU GLVFXVVLRQ RI GLIILFXOW VFHQDULRV RU µKDUG FDVHV¶ (see on this 
concept Dworkin, 1975: 1057).  
 
The outbreak of the Euro-crisis and the creation of the first mechanisms of financial 
assistance dramatically changed the situation (Wendel, 2014: 268). Art. 125 TFEU 
                                                          
1
 Former Art. 104b EC Treaty under the Maastricht Treaty regime and Art. 103 EC Treaty under the 
Amsterdam Treaty regime. 
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suddenly became the object of intense debate. The provision was at the core of political 
disputes regarding the convenience and legality of the granting of bailouts to European 
Union Member States undergoing financial problems. Parallel to debates among 
politicians, academics began to focus on the provision and polarized into two opposed 
groups: those asserting that the bailouts were forbidden under Article 125 TFEU and 
those who argued that they could be allowed, at least under certain circumstances (see 
inter alia, Louis, 2010: 976; Athanassiou, 2011:558; Palmstorfer, 2012; Lupo Pasini, 
2013). The debate still endures. A provision whose meaning was once uncontroversial 
had become the object of intense interpretative disagreement. 7KH µQR EDLORXW¶ FODXVH 
VHHPHG WRKDYH VXGGHQO\ EHFRPHDSDUDGLJPDWLF H[DPSOHRI DQ µLQGHWHUPLQDWH¶ OHJDO
provision, whose application to the difficult case of the µHuro bailouts¶ was polemic 
from all perspectives. 
 
This article analyzes the process through which the meaning of Art. 125 became 
contested. To do so, the article proposes changing the traditional approaches to the 
analysis of the determinacy of rules in legal theory. Instead of considering legal rules as 
either determinate or indeterminate, or anything in between,2 I shall argue that they are 
subject to processes of political µde-determination¶ and µre-determination¶ in which their 
meaning is the object of political struggles. More generally, drawing on the 
contributions of socio-legal literature (inter alia, Bourdieu, 1987 and 1991; Schepel and 
Wesseling, 1997; Picciotto, 2015), the article replaces the traditional static approach to 
the determinacy and meaning of rules for a dynamic one, capable of acknowledging 
their mutability and contestability. As I will show, when a formerly uncontroversial rule 
                                                          
2
 The contributions to this debate are extremely abundant. See inter alia Greenawalt, 1990; Leitier, 1995; 
Kutz, 1994; Maxeiner, 2006; Zapf and Moglen, 1995.  
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becomes the object of political struggles, a number of actors begin to compete with 
different interpretations about its meaning and application to real cases. In this 
interpretative competition, juridical actors, such as legal scholars, play a core role. 
Taking inspiration from Bourdieu (1987; 1991), the juridical field can be deemed to 
convert political struggles into legal ones, in which legal actors compete through their 
doctrinal interpretations and manage conflict through legal procedures. As Picciotto 
stated (2015:171), µODZ RSHUDWHV WR GHIXVH VRFLDO FRQIOLFWV DQG GHpoliticize them, 
shifting political and legal conflicts on to the terrain of debates over the symbolic power 
RI WH[WV¶ In this article, these processes by which the meaning of rules becomes 
contested will be called µSROLWLFDO SURFHVVHGRIGH-determination RI OHJDO UXOHV¶. Their 
GHILQLWLRQDVµSROLWLFDO¶ is due not only to the fact that political actors play a role in the 
processes but also to the fact that the driving force of such processes is a struggle for 
power: the power to impose a certain interpretation of a rule and to exclude the 
interpretation of the rival, be it a political adversary or a fellow academic. As they 
engage in a struggle for interpretative power, in these episodes, legal actors, such as 
courts3 or legal scholars, must also be considered, simultaneously, as political actors. 
 
With this background, in the next pages, I will explain the role of Art. 125 TFEU in the 
frame of the Euro-crisis. It will be shown WKDWWKHµQREDLORXW¶FODXVHILUVWXQGHUZHQWa 
process of de-determination as a consequence of the political controversy about the 
European financial instruments and subsequently underwent a process of judicial re-
determination before the Court of Justice as a consequence of the famous Pringle case. 
To do so, this article is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, I will explain 
my theoretical framework and discuss the dominant approaches to the determinacy of 
                                                          
3
 In this regard, see also Judicial Politics literature. 
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rules in legal theory, summarize the debates about the conventional nature of language 
in linguistics, and explain in detail my proposal for a dynamic approach to the problem 
of the meaning of legal rules. Next, I will briefly discuss the research design of this 
article, showing that it follows essentially a social science positivist qualitative 
approach. Subsequently, I will offer an empirical analysis, which constitutes the core of 
the article, discussing the politicization of Art. 125 TFEU in the period subsequent to 
2008, the academic debates around this provision and how the controversy was finally 
judicialized. It is only in this empirical section that the article engages with European 
Studies literature on the EMU, engaging particularly ZLWKOHJDOOLWHUDWXUHDERXWWKHµQR
EDLORXW¶SURYLVLRQThe article finishes with some conclusions. 
  
De-determination and re-determination of legal rules. Theoretical framework.  
 
This section presents a theoretical framework to account for the interpretative 
controversies around Art. 125 TFEU. It is divided into three subsections. In the first 
subsection, I summarize the traditional static approaches to the determinacy of legal 
rules in legal theory, and I propose replacing them with a dynamic one. In the second 
subsection, using linguistics and sociology, I assert that legal language is mutable and 
that the meaning of rules is subject to political pressures, and I describe how these 
SUHVVXUHVRSHUDWHLQZKDW,FDOOSURFHVVHVRIµGH-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶,QWKHWKLUGVXEVHFWLRQ, 
I finally analyze how legal systems address these de-determined rules, and in particular 
I scrutinize the role of judicial actors in formally fixing their meaning.  
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In some parts in this section, and especially in the first two subsections, the discussion 
of some important theories and schools of thought is very concise. The reason, in 
addition to space constraints, is that those schools of thought are only relevant to my 
argument to the extent that they address the topic of the determinacy of rules, and as a 
result, I deliberately overlook their other important aspects. Other theories that are more 
central to my argument, particularly Bourdieusian sociology of law, are discussed in 
more detail. Altogether, this section gives a theoretical grounding to the research 
hypothesis of the article, namely that increasing political polarization around the topic 
regulated by a rule, and not simply ambiguous wording of the rule, can explain why the 
meaning of the latter becomes contested (see also Picciotto, 2015). 
 
 
Revisiting the debate about the determinacy of legal rules 
 
Legal and political scholarship has long debated the degree of determinacy of legal rules. 
The old French École de la Exegese considered legal systems to be so determinate that 
judges could apply the law to the cases by simply following a syllogism (La Torre, 2007: 
94). Twentieth-century positivism changed the approach because it generally accepted a 
certain degree of indefiniteness in the law. For Kelsen (1960: 351), µWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
a statute, therefore, need not necessarily lead to a single decision as the only correct one, 
but possibly to several, which are all of equal value, though only one of them in the 
action of the law-DSSO\LQJ RUJDQ HVSHFLDOO\ WKH FRXUW EHFRPHV SRVLWLYH ODZ¶ In the 
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same vein, H.L.A. Hart spoke about the µSHQXPEUD RI OHJDO PHDQLQJ¶4 and the µRSHQ
WH[WXUH RI ODZ¶ )RU KLP µ(YHQ ZKHQ YHUEDOO\ IRUPXODWHG JHQHUDO UXOHV DUH XVHG
uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required by them may break out in particular 
FRQFUHWH FDVHV  &DQRQV RI ³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ FDQQRW HOLPLQDWH WKRXJK WKH\ FDQ
GLPLQLVKWKHVHXQFHUWDLQWLHV¶ (Hart, 2012[1961]: 126). To illustrate these uncertainties, 
Hart (2012[1961]: 127) used the example of the rule prohibiting the use of vehicles in a 
park in relation to the concrete case of an electrically propelled toy motor-car because 
ERWKLWV LQFOXVLRQDQGLWVH[FOXVLRQIURPWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµYHKLFOH¶are controversial. I 
will return to this example later on.  
 
Other schools of legal thought had been even more radical. For one of the founders of 
the µIree-law movement¶, Eugen Ehrlich (2005[1906]: 91-92), legal rules were 
characterized by ambiguity. For the Austrian scholar, the meaning and literal wording of 
a rule was only one of many forces that influence judges (Ehrlich, 2005[1903]: 84). A 
young Carl Schmitt also emphasized the indeterminacy of law, integrating this idea into 
an intellectual discourse that Scheurman (1996 590) considered an anticipation of his 
embrace of German National-Socialism. A less sinister contribution to these debates 
was that of American Legal Realism, which is in fact essential to understanding 
contemporary skeptical approaches to the determinacy of law. For Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. (1897), legal language was indeterminate, and the real explanation for 
judicial behaviour lay in variables beyond legal rules: µ7KHODQJXDJHRIMXGLFLDOGHFLVLRQ
LVPDLQO\WKHODQJXDJHRIORJLF«%XWFHUWDLQW\ JHQHUDOO\LVLOOXVLRQ«WKHGHFLVLRQ
FDQGRQRPRUHWKDQHPERG\WKHSUHIHUHQFHRIDJLYHQERG\LQDJLYHQWLPHDQGSODFH¶. 
Critical Legal Realism, and more recently the subdiscipline of Judicial Politics, have 
                                                          
4
 See for a discussion Coleman and Leitier, 1993: 565. 
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also emphasized this indeterminacy and therefore MXGJHV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR make 
unconstrained decisions, which would be explained with reference to political, social, 
psychological or institutional variables instead of legal ones (see Coleman and Leitier, 
1993: 549; Shapiro, 1964). Although probably not dominant among legal scholars, the 
µLQGHWHUPLQDF\WKHVLV¶HQMR\VDFHUWDLQSRSXODULW\DPRQJVRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVIn this regard, 
Coleman and Leitier distinguished a number of different varieties of this thesis and 
discussed their LPSOLFDWLRQV LQ WHUPVRIZKDW WKH\FDOO µOHJLWLPDWHJRYHUQDQFHE\ ODZ¶ 
(Coleman and Leitier, 1993:559 ff.). 
 
As the reader can observe, the different schools of thought presented in the previous 
paragraphs disagree regarding the degree of determinacy of legal rules. However, all 
these approaches have something in common: Whatever their stance regarding the 
ontological nature of legal rules might be, it is always static. Rules are considered to be 
either determinate or indeterminate; however, once they are so, they remain so forever. 
In these approaches, the degree of determinacy of rules is deemed to be a quality of the 
very rules or of language, disconnected from the community of speakers and the 
changing system of conventions that said community of speakers reproduce. This article 
proposes radically questioning this premise. The idea that I want to defend is that legal 
rules are actually subject to processes of de-determination and re-determination. In this 
article, thus, I take a dynamic approach to the question of determinacy of legal rules. To 
ground it, I will focus on socio-political and socio-legal processes in which a plurality 
of actors competes for the construction of hegemonic interpretations of the law and the 
control of processes of constitutional mutation. 
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The politicization of the meaning of legal rules 
 
IQ.ULSNH¶VUHDGLQJRI:ittgenstein, the meaning of a rule cannot be established with 
reference to objective facts (truth-conditions) but rather with reference to the conditions 
in which a community of language users permits the assertion of a certain sentence 
(assertability-conditions) (Coleman and Leitier, 1993:570). This approach suggests that 
we should understand rules as linguistic enunciates ZKRVH PHDQLQJ LV µVRFLDOO\¶
constructed by the community of speakers of the language. As argued by Picciotto 
(2015:169), µOLQJXLVWLF VLJQLILHUV ZRUGV GR QRW KDYH DQ LQWULQVLF PHDQLQJ 0HDQLQJ
depends on the linguistic context. Because language is social, this also means its social 
FRQWH[W DQG WKDW PHDQLQJ LV FRQVWUXFWHG WKURXJK VRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQ¶ The social 
construction of meanings is indeed, like many sociological phenomena, cross-cut by 
political processes and struggles for power. In this subsection, with the aid of linguistics, 
sociology and political science, I will propose a dynamic approach to the question of the 
determinacy of rules capable of accounting for the political nature of the process of 
construction of meanings.  
 
Because law is language (see Coleman and Leitier, 1993: 568 ff.), linguistics has much 
to tell us about the question of the determinacy of rules. Prior to structuralist linguistics, 
meanings were deemed based upon the relationships between words and facts. In this 
period, µODQJXDJHZDVQRWXQGHUVWRRGWRFUHDWHPHDQLQJEXWUDWKHUWRRSerate as a tool 
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to uncover and manipulate a concealed, but already known RUNQRZDEOHRUGHU¶ (Heller, 
1984: 134). From this perspective, the relation of the speaker with language was 
instrumental because the latter was deemed to adapt over time to fit the needs of its 
users (Heller, 1984: 139). The emergence of structuralism at the beginning of the 20th 
century was marked by the de-centring of human agency in the process of creation of 
meaning (Barker and Galasinki, 2001: 4),WµUHORFDWHGWKHSURGXFWLRQRIPHDQLQJZLWKLQ
WKH QHWZRUN RI UHODWLRQV WKDW ZDV WKH ODQJXDJH LWVHOI¶ VR WKDW QRZ µWKH VSHDNHU LV
GHSHQGHQWRQODQJXDJHLWVHOIWRHQJDJHLQPHDQLQJIXODFWLYLWLHV¶DQG that the subject is 
understood as a product of culture (Heller, 1984: 140). The conventional roots of 
language were not, however, entirely challenged. For Saussure, PHDQLQJ ZDV VWLOO µD
social convention generated by signifying practices that organize the relation between 
VLJQV¶ (Barker and Galasinki, 2001:4). In structuralism, µPHDQLQJ LV FXOWXUDOO\ DQG
KLVWRULFDOO\VSHFLILF¶DQGµWKHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQVLJQLILHUVDQGVLJQLILHGVDUHRUJDQL]HG
DQGPDLQWDLQHGWKURXJKVRFLDOFRQYHQWLRQVLQWRFXOWXUDOFRGHV¶ (Barker and Galasinki, 
2001: 4-5). Although in a very different and more complex way, for structuralism 
ODQJXDJHFRQWLQXHV WREH D VRFLDO FRQYHQWLRQ µD VRFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQ FRPSRVHGRI IRUPV
that pre-exist WKHLQGLYLGXDOVSHHFKDFWV¶ (Heller, 1984: 141).  
 
Post-structuralism takes a radically different direction. For post-structuralists, such as 
Laclau and Mouffe, µPHDQLQJFDQQHYHUEHILQDOO\ILxed; it is always in flux, unstable 
and precarious. The being of objects and people can never be encapsulated, once and for 
all, in a closed system RI GLIIHUHQFHV¶ (Wetherell, 1998: 393). This has enormous 
implications for legal language. If, as proposed by post-structuralists, meaning is always 
in dispute, it is a task of legal theory to understand the social processes through which 
the meaning of legal rules is established, contested and mutated. Because these 
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processes imply struggles over meaning and power relations (see Picciotto, 2015: 169), 
they are political processes. Pierre Bourdieu might help us understand them. The French 
sociologist is difficult to classify in any school of thinking. Although law was not his 
main topic of research, he devoted some ZULWLQJVWRZKDWKHFDOOHGµWKHjuridical ILHOG¶ 
(espec. Bourdieu, 1987 and 1991; see also Dezalay and Madsen, 2012). Bourdieusian 
sociology of law acknowledged the power of individuals, at least of certain µTXDOLILHG¶ 
individuals, to create and recreate the meaning of legal rules. According to Bourdieu 
(1987: 817), µ7KH MXULGLFDO ILHOG LV WKH VLWH RI D FRPSHWLWLRQ IRU WKH PRQRSRO\ RI WKH
ULJKW WRGHWHUPLQH WKH ODZ¶ (see also Schepel and Wesseling, 1997: 170). For García-
Villegas (2006: 347)µVXFKVWUXJJOHLVQRWRQO\LQWHOOHFWXDOEXWDOVRSROLWLFDOJLYHQWKH
fact that most legal debates have direct implications for the distribution of power and 
JRRGVWKDWRFFXUVLQWKHSROLWLFDOILHOG¶  
 
In Bourdieusian sociology of law, the elasticity of legal texts gives the operation of 
judgement considerable freedom, so that ex post facto rationalization of decisions 
becomes usual (García-Villegas, 2006: 827). 0F&RUPLFN¶V¶ (2001:396) definition of 
µGHFLVLRQLVP¶LQthe work of Derrida can indeed be useful to understand this point of the 
theory of Bourdieu because in the view of the Scottish legal philosopher, decisionism 
µHPSKDVL]HVWKHXOWLPDWHO\XQJURXQGHGQDWXUHRIKXPDQFKRLFHV7KHPRPHQWRUIDFW
RIGHFLVLRQVWDNHVSUHFHGHQFHRYHUMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶. However, in Bourdieu (1987: 827), the 
decision of a judge is never her solitary act: µ7KH SUDFWLFDO FRQWHQW RI WKe law which 
emerges in the judgement is the product of a symbolic struggle between professionals 
possessing unequal technical skills and social influence¶. The juridical field converts 
direct conflict between parties into regulated debate between (legal) professionals who 
accept the rules of the field (Bourdieu, 1987: 831).  
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To illustrate this, I will use WKHH[DPSOHRI+DUW¶VSURKLELWLRQRIYHKLFOHV in the park. 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, first, one would find competing definitions of what is 
a vehicle. 7KHVHFRPSHWLQJGHILQLWLRQVZRXOGEHSURYLGHGE\VSHFLDOLVWVSRVVHVVLQJµD
SDUWLFXODUO\ UDUH IRUP RI FXOWXUDO FDSLWDO ZKLFK ZH WHUP MXULGLFDO FDSLWDO¶ (Bourdieu, 
1987: 842), which would translate a social conflict around the use a toy motor-car in the 
park into a juridical conflict regulated by law. The conflict would then be resolved by a 
court, which is relatively unconstrained by legal texts given the elasticity of the latter 
but which must make a decision in the frame of, and as a product of, a struggle between 
the different interpretations of the law put forward by legal professionals. In the view of 
this article, legal scholars fulfil a core role in this regard because they provide 
interpretations of the law and are, so to speakµSURGXFHUVRIPHDQLQJ¶ 
 
Recent literature on European Judicial Politics has also noted the important role of legal 
scholarship. For Dyevre (2010: 322), in developing doctrines and normative arguments, 
legal scholars fulfil at least two functions: They help the courts persuade their audience, 
and they help litigants persuade the court. From the perspective of this article, the 
function of legal scholars is directly connected to the conventional nature of language 
that the field of linguistics has acknowledged, as well as to the disputed nature of 
meaning emphasized by post-structuralism. I return to the example of +DUW¶VSURKLELWLRQ
of vehicles: Whether a toy motor-car is considered a vehicle (and hence forbidden in the 
park) depends on the socially constructed definition of vehicle, which may change over 
time and which may be (as in this case) contested. If the rule prohibiting vehicles in the 
park is deemed indeterminate, it is because there is no consensus about its application to 
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the case because its interpretation is controversial, and different actors compete with 
their different interpretations of the meaning of the prohibition in relation to the toy 
motor-car.  
 
In real-life legal cases, the more influential interpretations are those made by those 
actors considered by Bourdieu as having more µMXULGLFDOFDSLWDO¶such as legal scholars. 
Legal scholars may compete in the juridical field with different interpretations of the 
law, and it is precisely the existence of these diverging interpretations that renders law 
indeterminate. In terms familiar to some streams of post-structuralism, the 
interpretations about the meaning of rules constitute the meaning of the rules, 
particularly if they are provided by more influential specialists: These interpretations are 
performative in that they create the meaning that they interpret (see also Schepel and 
Wesseling, 1997: 167). Rules are determinate as long as there is consensus around their 
meaning. If this consensus is contested, they may XQGHUJR D SURFHVV RI µGH-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶ 
 
As specialists whose opinion is deemed to have an additional technical legitimacy, legal 
scholars WKXVSOD\DSURPLQHQWUROHLQµGH-GHWHUPLQLQJ¶RUµUH-GHWHUPLQLQJ¶WKHPHDQLQJ
of rules through their interpretations. However, in performing their functions, they are 
not isolated. Following Picciotto (2015: 172), scholarly interpretative competitions must 
be analyzed in their wider political context. The relationship between the legal field and 
other social forces was underlined by Bourdieu (1987: 850):  
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µ*LYHQWKHGHWHUPLQDQWUROHLWSOD\VLQVRFLDOUHSURGXFWLRQ WKH
juridical field has a smaller degree of autonomy than other 
ILHOGV « ([WHUQDO FKDQJHV DUH PRUH GLUHFWO\ UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH
juridical field, and internal conflicts within the field are more 
GLUHFWO\GHFLGHGE\H[WHUQDOIRUFHV«,WLVDVLIWKHSRVLWLRQVRI
different specialists in the organization of power within the 
juridical field were determined by the place occupied in the 
political field by the group whose interests are most closely tied 
WRWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJOHJDOUHDOP¶ 
 
Politics thus have an essential function in processes of de-determination or re-
determination, especially regarding constitutional rules. Once a topic enters into the 
political agenda, political actors may develop diverging preferences regarding the topic, 
and in parallel may propose diverging interpretations of a formerly uncontroversial legal 
rule. Consensus around meaning may change or disappear, with political actors 
defending new interpretations coherent with their changing policy preferences. Politics 
interfere with language by making the meaning of legal rules a contested question. 
Instead of regulating political conflict, both law and the meaning of rules become the 
very object of politics. Here is where the interaction between political struggles and 
legal academia becomes more visible. For Bourdieu, law is a discipline with clear socio-
political applications, and academic jurists often use their knowledge to seek practical 
solutions to societal problems (Dezalay and Madsen, 2012: 438). In translating political 
preferences regarding the application of a rule to legal arguments about its interpretation, 
WKH\ FDQ XVH µWKH V\PEROLF SRZHU RI ODZ DV D WRRO IRU RUGHULQJ SROLWLFV ZLWKRXW
QHFHVVDULO\GRLQJSROLWLFV¶ (Dezalay and Madsen, 2012: 438). In these and similar cases, 
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scholarly interpretation becomes part of a wider political battle, in which legal rules and 
their meaning play a privileged role. 
 
 
 Political and judicial mechanism of disambiguation of rules 
 
We have seen that, in the frame of a process of politicization of a topic, the interaction 
between political and legal actors may give rise to dynamics of interpretative 
contestation of the meaning of legal rules. Norms once uncontroversial became de-
determined when disagreement about their meaning vis-à-vis a concrete case arises. 
Controversial legal rules may nonetheless also be subject to processes of 
disambiguation. In principle, there are two main ways to give a clear meaning to a rule 
whose interpretation is ± or has become ± controversial. One is political and is carried 
out mainly by political actors, and the other is judicial and takes place via judicial 
interpretation. When controversial rules are constitutional in nature, legal doctrine 
usually refers to these processes as constitutional amendment and constitutional 
mutation, respectively. 
 
7KHSROLWLFDO SURFHVVRIGLVDPELJXDWLRQRI UXOHV WDNHVSODFHZKHQSROLWLFDO DFWRUV µUH-
ZULWH¶D UXOH WRFODULI\ LWVPHDQLQJ ,Q WKHFDVHRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQV WKLV WDNHV
place via constitutional amendment. For that reason, rather than calling this a µUH-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶ RI WKH UXOH, we should call it a µUH-ZRUGLQJ¶ The meaning of the rule 
becomes less controversial, simply because its very words have changed. Thus, I have 
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opted to reserve WKH QRWLRQ RI µUH-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶ for the process through which the 
meaning of a rule is disambiguated without changing its wording, which often occurs 
via judicial interpretation. Stone Sweet (2002) suggests that judicial activity can be 
understood as a triadic mode of dispute resolution. In his model, by deciding, the 
dispute-UHVROYHU µPDNHV UXOHV WKDW DUH FRQFUHWH SDUWLFXODU DQG UHWURVSHFWLYH¶, and by 
justifying her decision, µVKHPDNHVUXOHVRIDQDEVWUDFWJHQHUDODQGSURVSHFWLYHQDWXUH¶ 
(Stone Sweet, 2002: 64). What I call processes of re-determination of rules refers to the 
first function, by which a court fixes and determines the meaning of a provision. In fact, 
the dynamic nature of the meaning of rules, which this article seeks to understand, is 
acknowledged by judicial actors everywhere. Leading higher courts accept, under 
different arguments, that old legal concepts must be re-interpreted according to 
changing social needs and the evolving understandings of such rules, preferred by 
newer generations. From the perspective of this article, when they do so, they are often 
simply admitting that a rule has been de-determined, that consensus over its meaning 
has changed or disappeared and that a judicial fixation of its meaning has become 
necessary. 
 
Courts thus fulfil a function of re-determination of legal rules. For Bourdieu (1987: 818), 
jurists compete through their different interpretations of the law; however, they are 
SODFHG ZLWKLQ D ERG\ RUJDQL]HG LQ KLHUDUFKLFDO OHYHOV µFDSDEOH RI UHVROYLQJ FRQIOLFWV
EHWZHHQLQWHUSUHWHUVDQGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV¶ (see also Schepel and Wesseling, 1997: 170). 
When different actors begin to disagree regarding the meaning of a provision ± when 
the provision has been de-determined ± they may have recourse to judiciaries to resolve 
the dispute. Courts will then give an authoritative interpretation of the rule, which is 
generally binding upon the parties because it is, as stated by Bourdieu, µWKHVRYHUHLJQ
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YLVLRQRI WKH6WDWH¶ (Bourdieu, 1987: 838). Their interpretations of the law involve, to 
reference Picciotto (2015: 171), social and political power. While it may be true that 
certain individuals may continue to disagree with the interpretation provided by the 
court, the binding nature of judicial decisions imposes a new de facto consensus around 
the meaning of the norm. Such a judicial decision should create systemic coherence, 
providing actors with clarity and certainty for future cases, qualities traditionally 
considered necessary for a legal system to be perceived as fair and to function 
adequately (inter alia, Neuhaus, 1963; Erickson et al., 1977). The different actors may 
not necessarily accept the new meaning of the disputed rule because they find the 
reasoning of the court convincing but may do so simply because they accept the 
legitimacy of the court to resolve disputes over the meaning of the rules.  
 
 
A few words on research design 
 
This article takes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the evolution of the 
meaning of Art. 125 7)(8WKHµQRbailout clause¶which combines legal theory, legal-
doctrinal analysis and empirical social sciences research. Regarding the latter, this 
article aims to document with evidence a change in the hegemonic interpretation of the 
explored rule because at a certain point, interpretative controversy around the meaning 
of Art. 125 soared. The article shows that this change is the result of the politicization of 
the question of the bailouts after the crisis placed it firmly on the political agenda. 
Because the wording of the provision remained constant, legalistic explanations can be 
discarded and the focus can be placed on socio-political accounts of the phenomenon. 
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Legal-doctrinal analysis, however, was also essential to construct the argument of the 
article because documenting WKHFKDQJHVLQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHµQREDLORXW¶FODXVH
required the exhaustive analysis of doctrinal texts. It is in the writings of legal scholars 
ZKHUHZHILQGWKHµFRQYHnWLRQDO¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI$UW 125 TFEU and where the basic 
claim that the dominant interpretation of this provision evolved over time can be tested. 
Legal scholars, thus, will explain what Art. 125 TFEU µPHDQW¶DW each moment in time, 
or, in other terms, what Art. 125 TFEU was thought to mean before and after the 
upsurge of the Euro-crisis.  
 
Three methodological clarifications are necessary in this regard. First, the article 
focuses on the writings of legal scholars as a means to capture the constructions of the 
meaning of Art. 125 TFEU and the struggles around its interpretation and excludes 
writings about that topic by academics in other fields. The reason for this focus is that, 
following the theoretical framework, it is legal scholars who specialize in the 
construction of meanings and in the competition for the hegemonic interpretation of the 
law. Pieces produced by other academics, inter alia economists and political scientists, 
are also discussed in other regards but are not considered part of the struggle for the 
interpretation of law that operates mainly in the legal field, even if the boundaries 
between disciplines and functions are sometimes fuzzy. Second, the article focuses on 
English-language doctrinal materials. In addition to the usual practical impossibility of 
analyzing materials in all other languages, English has been selected as the current 
lingua franca of European legal academia. Third, to reconstruct the interpretative 
struggles of legal academia, this article focuses essentially on materials published until 
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the beginning of 2013. The reason for this focus is that on May 2013, the reform of Art. 
136 TFEU came into force, and hence, this µYDULDEOH¶ceased to be constant. One of the 
consequences of this change is that the article does not cover subsequent important 
episodes of the legal dynamics of the Euro-crisis, such as the OMT reference of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court. However, in doing so, the article seeks to 
maximize reliability and provide a clean and clear research design. 
 
Combining the legal and social science perspectives, this article aims to show the 
potential of interdisciplinary approaches to understanding episodes such as the 
interpretative dynamics of Art. 125 TFEU. These dynamics can only be properly 
accounted for when combining different research methods. Social science cannot 
understand the evolution of meanings of Art. 125 TFEU through time without the help 
of legal scholarship and the narratives about the meaning of the rule that it created. At 
the same time, however, doctrinal analysis cannot understand the causes of this 
evolution without the aid of social science approaches and their emphasis on power and 
conflict. 
 
 
$QDO\VLV7KHµQREDLORXW¶FODXVH as a case study 
 
In this section, in the light of the theoretical framework set out above, I shall analyze the 
empirical case of Art. 125 TFEU, the well-NQRZQ µQR bailout¶ FODXVH. The section is 
divided into three parts. In the first subsection, I analyze academic production about this 
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provision before the outbreak of the crisis in Europe. I will show that the range of legal 
interpretations of the rule was narrow and that doctrinal controversy about its meaning 
was mild in this period. In the second subsection, I analyze academic production on the 
rule once the crisis started, showing the increased attention paid by legal scholars to the 
rule and the growing controversy about its meaning in a context of political polarization 
about the bailouts. In this process, the meaning of Art. 125 TFEU became contested. In 
the third subsection, I illustrate how the legal system intervened to resolve the 
interpretative dispute, and I describe in detail how in the Pringle case the Court of 
Justice stabilized the controversial meaning of the provision. 
 
 
A credible commitment? The analyses of the µQREDLORXW¶ clause before the outbreak of 
the crisis in the European Union 
 
As widely known, since at least 2009, the European Union has suffered from a severe 
economic and financial crisis, which has affected certain Member States more intensely 
than others. Within the Euro-zone, countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and 
Cyprus encountered increasing difficulty repaying or refinancing their debt. The 
Spanish banking system, as well as some EU countries outside the Euro-zone, such as 
Hungary, Latvia 5  and Romania, faced similar problems. To address this delicate 
economic situation, DV\VWHPRIµEDLORXWV¶ZDVGHVLJQHGWKrough which these countries 
would receive financial assistance in exchange for certain political and economic 
reforms, usually involving important social cutbacks. However, the treaties of the 
                                                          
5
 Latvia joined the Euro only in 2014. 
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European Union included a certaLQUHJXODWLRQRIHYHQWXDOµEDLORXWV¶, and soon all actors 
turned their eyes to these provisions. The main rules affecting the mechanisms of 
financial assistance were Arts.122, 125 and 126 TFEU. Article 125 TFEU contains the 
µQREDLORXW¶FODXVH  
 
µ7KH8QLRQVKDOOQRWEHOLDEOHIRURUassume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies 
governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, 
without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a 
specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public 
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for 
the joint execution of a specific project. 
 
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the 
application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in 
WKLV$UWLFOH¶ 
  
From the perspective of static approaches to the determinacy of rules, Art. 125 TFEU 
should be considered either determinate or indeterminate, or something in between. 
Scholars could argue that the meaning of the rule was clear and that it either forbade or 
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authorized the bailouts. They could also consider Art. 125 TFEU indeterminate, at least 
to some extent, so that courts applying it to a particular dispute would have broad 
discretion in making their decisions, even leaving room for political preferences and 
biases. My argument is that in all of these views, something essential would go 
unnoticed: the dynamic processes through which the meanings of rules are constructed 
and modified over time. In traditional approaches, rules would be assumed to have a 
certain, constant level of determinacy, and this level of determinacy would depend on 
the rule and its wording, instead of the processes of political competition that shape and 
mutate their meanings over time. 
 
Paradoxically, scholarly production about the meaning of rules is one of the main ways 
through which meanings are performatively constructed (see Schepel and Wesseling, 
1997: 167). ThHZRUGLQJRIWKHµQREDLORXW¶ provision after the Lisbon Treaty took force 
had remained essentially the same as in the pre-Lisbon period. What is now Art. 125 
TFEU had been Art. 103 EC under the Amsterdam regime and Art. 104b EC under the 
Maastricht regime. The first paragraph of the current Art. 125 TFEU has remained 
practically unaltered over this period, and the second paragraph only underwent a small 
modification of a more procedural than substantive character. For that reason, the 
doctrinal interpretations of former Art. 103 EC (Amsterdam)/104b EC (Maastricht) 
should theoretically apply without difficulty to Art. 125 TFEU.  
 
Although the outpouring of literature on the topic of the bailouts began in 2009, it 
would be incorrect to suggest that there was no academic production on this topic before 
that year. However, in the pre-crisis period, DQDO\VHVRIWKHµQRbailRXW¶provision were 
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generally made incidentally, as a by-product of more general reviews of the European 
Monetary Union. References before 2009 to former Art. 104b TEC can be found in the 
work of a few lawyers, some political scientists and a good number of economists. With 
very few exceptions 6 , legal analyses of the provision were generally limited to 
reiterating the explicit wording of the treaty and indicating that bailouts were forbidden, 
without further discussion of hypothetical hard cases. In their piece on the topic, Hessel 
and Mortelmans (1993) simply insisted on the prohibition and recalled that it could also 
affect national and local authorities. In a similar vein, Verdun (1997: 25; apud Snyder, 
1999: 439-440) suggested that all the members of Delors Committee, which had a 
leading role in the creation of the EMU, wanted national governments to remain fully 
responsible for national macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Some years later, Heipertz 
and Verdun (2004: 777-778) VWDWHGµWKHQREDLO-out clause implies that neither the ECB 
nor the Community will provide funds to or buy bonds of a national government that 
EHFRPHV LQVROYHQW¶ The approach taken by Francis Snyder (1999: 450) is also worth 
noting because although this author focused on overdraft facilities, he rejected the 
interpretation that they might be granted in emergency situations 7 . Even current 
literature, when analyzing WKH(08UHWURVSHFWLYHO\VXJJHVWVWKDWµDWLWVLQFHSWLRQ«
the possibility of a bail-out frRP WKH FHQWUH ZDV H[SOLFLWO\ H[FOXGHG LQ WKH 7UHDW\¶ 
(Hinarejos, 2013: 1625.)8. The most widespread idea was that bailouts were forbidden 
                                                          
6
 Fratiani et al. (1992:39), when discussing the Maastricht regime the no-bailout provision, VWDWHGWKDWµDV
a matter of principle, the Community shall not be responsible for any financial obligations incurred by 
PHPEHUJRYHUQPHQWV«>EXW@0HPEHUVWDWHVLQDGHEWFULVLVZLOOFRQWLQXHKRZHYHUWRKDYHWKHULJKWWR
be bailed out by the Community RUE\RWKHUPHPEHUV¶ 
7
 µ(08DOVRSURKLELWV0HPEHU6WDWHVIURPPDNLQJXVHRIRYHUGUDIWIDFLOLWLHVZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ&HQWUDO
Bank (ECB) or national central banks or from offering debt instruments for purchase by the ECB or 
national central banks. It also confers on the ECB the exclusive right to authorize the issue of banknotes 
within the community. It limits the access to capital markets of Member States with an excessive budget 
deficit. At least one author has suggested that technically the European System of Central Banks could 
come to the rescue of a participating Member State in the event of economic shocks, but such an 
interpretation of the Treaty may stretch the bounds of political IHDVLELOLW\¶ 
8
 See p.1628 ff. for a discussion about to what extent, in the opinion of the author, the bailouts in the Euro 
zone adhered to Art. 125TFEU. 
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under European law; however, hypothetical µhard FDVHV¶ VXch as those created by the 
European crisis were generally not analyzed by legal academics. The range of 
interpretations of the provision provided by legal scholars was narrow at that time, and 
controversy was notably lesser than in the period following the outbreak of the crisis 
(see next subsection). 
 
It is worth noting, however, that in the work of a number of authors, usually economists, 
something more substantial can be found: a deep distrust in the effectiveness of the 
provision in the event of an actual crisis. As early as 1997, Alexander and Anker (p.346) 
wrote that µGHVSLWH WKH IDFW WKDW WKH Maastricht Treaty contains a no bailout clause, 
serious doubts arise about its credibility¶ Discussing the Delors Report and the 
amendments of the treaties, Artis (1992: 306) suggested that µ7KHDUJXPHQWLPSOicit in 
their position must be that the externality of a fiscal crisis in one country cannot be 
shrugged off; in reality there would be political pressure to bail out the country 
concerned and the bail-out operation would imply an over-expansionary monetary 
SROLF\¶+RO]PDQQet al. (1996: 35) even went a step further: µ$UWEFOHarly states 
that neither the EU nor individual member states are liable for the obligations of a 
defaulting country. Once faced with default, however, it is clear that the governments 
will not stick to the treaty if they judge the costs of treaty conformity higher than of 
GHYLDWLRQ¶. For Arnold and Lemmen (2001: 109), µ$UWLFOH%RIWKH0DDVWULFKW7UHDW\
forbids the ECB or EU to bail out troubled governments, but it remains to be seen 
ZKHWKHU WKLV SULQFLSOH ZLOO EH XSKHOG LQ WLPHV RI FULVLV¶ Herdegen (1998: 26) also 
acknowledged the prohibition of bailRXWVLQWKHWUHDW\EXWDGGHGWKDWWKLVµGRHVQRWUXOH
out the possibility that the Community and national authorities will yield to pressure to 
UHVFXHD0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ 
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Note that, unlike the legal scholars mentioned earlier, the latter authors were not 
contesting the meaning of the provision. They were not conducting a doctrinal analysis 
of how to interpret the rule, nor were they suggesting that the provision allows for 
bailouts in certain exceptions. In fact, in their writings, there seems to be an implicit 
agreement with the hegemonic interpretation of the provision: the general prohibition of 
bailouts. Rather than questioning its meaning, these authors were suggesting that in the 
event of an actual crisis, the prohibition would be simply ignored. Their analysis is not 
legal but rather purely political. In an intuitive fashion, these writings acknowledged the 
political pressures that the rule would suffer in the event of an actual crisis and 
advanced the process of politicization of the rule that we examine in this article. Indeed, 
their predictions seem to find a certain echo in post-bailouts legal literature about the 
Euro-FULVLV8VLQJ+HOOHU¶VFRQFHSWRI µDXWKRULWDULDQ OLEHUDOLVP¶DV D VWDUWLQJSRLQW IRU
his analysis, Wilkinson (2015: 330) recently observed that µLIQRWDEODWDQWYLRODWLRQRI
the rule of law, at least a willingness to play fast and loose with it, notably with regard 
to the so-FDOOHG ³QR EDLORXW SURYLVLRQ´ RI $UWLFOH 7)(8¶. In the same vein, 
Menéndez XQGHUOLQHG µWKH ³LQQRYDWLYH´ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WUHDW\SURYLVLRQV
such as the no-EDLORXWFODXVH¶. 
 
The situation of scarce doctrinal reflection about Art. 125 TFEU in the pre-crisis period 
described earlier, however, changed radically after 2009. With the start of the crisis, a 
great deal of academic debate emerged, reaching its peak in approximately 2014. In 
parallel, WKHPHDQLQJRIWKHµQREDLORXW¶UXOHEHFDPH increasingly contested in light of 
the situation faced by countries such as Greece. As shown in the next subsection, the 
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crisis was the catalyst for a process of de-determination of the provision, having a 
double impact on it. On RQHKDQGLWSURYLGHGIRUDµhard FDVH¶DURXQGZKLFh academic 
debate could be created. On the other hand, it politicized Art. 125 so that stances 
regarding its interpretation had enormous political implications. The range and depth of 
interpretations of the provision widened, and its meaning became controversial. The fact 
that the wording of this provision had not changed in the context of the crisis is helpful 
in terms of research design because one essential µvariable¶ remained constant. Thus, if 
the meaning of Art. 125 TFEU changed and became controversial during the last few 
years, then such change must be due to factors other than purely legalistic ones. 
Furthermore, the wording of Arts.122 and 126 had not changed either. The only notable 
change in the treaty frame was the introduction of Art. 136 (3) TFEU; however, its entry 
into force took place after the ratification of the ESM, which is subsequent to the time 
period covered by this article. When the CJEU ruled on the Pringle case, the treaty 
frame was the same as it had been before the crisis. 
 
 
The acadePLFSRODUL]DWLRQDURXQGWKHµQREDLORXW¶FODXVHDQGLWVFRQWHVWHGPHDQLQJ 
 
7KHDGYHQWRI WKHFULVLVFUHDWHGDFRQWLQHQWDOGHEDWHRQ WKHTXHVWLRQRI WKHµEDLORXWV¶
Political parties at the State level became increasingly divided on the question. While 
major parties of EU Member States generally supported the bailouts, parties as diverse 
as the British UKIP, the German Die Linke and the Greek Syriza opposed them, 
although for radically different reasons. In many countries, the question of the bailouts 
became one of the centres of gravity of political and social debate. Dyson (2013: 219) 
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documents the tension created in creditor States, and particularly Germany, where the 
Bundesbank, Federal Chancellor Merkel and the parties in the coalition Government 
CSU/CDU and FPD were initially highly reluctant to take a more flexible approach to 
the Maastricht provisions on EMU. When the crisis worsened and more decisive action 
had to be taken, creditor States shaped the negotiations with reference to Art. 125 TFEU 
(Dyson, 2010: 605). In parallel, as shown by Closa and Maastch (2014: 838), the µno 
bailout¶ rule was mobilized in certain countries by Eurosceptic right-wing parties in 
their rhetoric. All these episodes show the increasing politicization of Art. 125 TFEU.  
 
Furthermore, political debate on the rule was soon converted into legal debate. This 
conversion operated through two connected processes. First, lawyers intervened in the 
political debate about the convenience of the bailouts with doctrinal arguments about 
their legality, which will be analyzed in this subsection. Second, in a subsequent stage, 
the Court of Justice intervened to end the doctrinal debate, thus re-determining the 
meaning of Art. 125 TFEU, which will be analyzed in the next subsection. 
 
,Q3LFFLRWWR¶VUHDGLQJRI%RXUGLHXFRKHUHQFHHPHUJHVLQWKHOHJDOILHOG in 
part through its social organization, which produces mutual understanding based on 
µKDELWXV¶7KHFRQFHSWRIKDELWXVFDQEHGHILQHGDVµWKHVKDUHGVHWRIGLVSRVLWLRQV WKDW
RULHQWWKHDJHQWVLQDSDUWLFXODUILHOGDQGLQUHJDUGWRRWKHUILHOGV¶0DGVHQ011: 265). 
Previous socio-legal research on European integration has suggested that the habitus of 
the European legal community is one that depoliticizes European integration in the 
frame of a cohesive field (Schepel and Wesseling, 1997; Jettinghoff, 2004: 5). In the 
case at stake, the emergence of interpretative controversy around Art. 125 TFEU can be 
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deemed a disruption of such habitus, created by the political salience of the bailouts and 
their regulation. As noted above, at a certain point, legal academics began to focus on 
Art. 125 TFEU as much as political actors were, and the provision became µWKHVXEMHFW
RI LQWHQVH FRQWURYHUVLHV DPRQJ OHJDO VFKRODUV¶ (Herman, 2013: 410). According to 
Wendel (2014: 268)µWKHGLVFXVVLRQDOUHDG\VWDUWHGZLWKELODteral financial aids and the 
()6)¶7KHPHFKDQLVPVRIILQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHEHFDPH+DUW¶VµWR\PRWRU-FDU¶WKHFDVH
that had not been originally envisaged by the rule and that, therefore, questioned its 
meaning and its definiteness. Some authors acknowledged the lack of consensus on the 
meaning of Art. 125 (Parmstorfer, 2012: 772) and indicated the existence of two groups: 
those supporting the legality of bailouts such as those contained in the EFSF and those 
considering them forbidden under the provision (Closa and Maatsch, 2014: 828 ff.). 
This polarization is the clearest proof that the µQREDLORXW¶ UXOH had become an under-
determinate legal provision, whose once uncontroversial meaning was now contested. 
De Witte and Beukers (2013:809-810) illustrated well these emerging debates: 
 
³«LW ZDV QRW HQWLUHO\ FHUWDLQ ZKHWKHU WKH FUHDWLRQ RI WKH
EFSF complied with the primary norm laid down in Article 
125 TFEU that prohibits EU States from being liable for or 
assuming commitments of other EU States (the so-called 
³QR-EDLORXW´ UXOH 7KH JRYHUQPHQWV FRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKH
EFSF mechanism of lending money subject to severe 
conditionality was not caught by the Treaty prohibition on 
giving (direct) financial support, but this interpretation was 
FRQWURYHUVLDO´ 
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The legal academia had rapidly perceived the importance that Art. 125 TFEU was to 
have in the context of the crisis. Academics polarized around the interpretation of the 
rule. For some academics, the bailouts were legal from the perspective of EU law. As 
noted above, this position coincided with that of the main parties in the Union and with 
that of national governments such as the German one9 (see Wendel, 2013: 26). With an 
ironic comment, Joerges (2014: 294) explained his view of this relation between 
political SUHIHUHQFHV DQG GRFWULQDO SRVLWLRQV µ/DZ\HUV SUDFWLWLRQHUV DQG DFDGHPLFV
alike, have all traditionally sought to remain on good terms with political power. When 
it comes to Articles 122-126 TFEU, our discipline can apparently not resist helping 
political and institutional actors by taking the letter of the law so lightly as to run afoul 
of it¶ 
 
One guest editorial by Jean-Victor Louis (2010) at Common Market Law Review was 
devoted to defending the legality of the bailouts. In the view of the author, Art.  122(2) 
could be used to grant financial assistance to Member States in severe difficulty in 
µH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶DQG WKHRQ-going crisis would fit in that category (Louis, 
2010: 984). Even if Arts. 125 and 126 had to be taken into account when granting 
ILQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHWKHVLWXDWLRQKDGGHJHQHUDWHGµLQWRDQDV\PPHWULFVKRFNRUDsuck 
FRPPRQWRDQXPEHURI0HPEHU6WDWHVLQDSHULRGRIVHULRXVFULVLV¶ (Louis, 2010:984), 
and this meant that Art. 122 could be used subject to conditionality and on a temporary 
basis (Louis, 2010:985). Furthermore, the author asserts that although Art. 122(2) TFEU 
provides for action by the EU, loans by Member States arHQRWSURKLELWHGE\ WKH µQR
                                                          
9
 See for instance its position during the assessment of the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (Wendel, 2013: 26). 
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EDLORXW¶clause (Louis, 2010:985). The author concludes his article by referring to the 
SRVVLELOLW\ RI D SHUPDQHQW PHFKDQLVP µWKH FUHDWLRQ RI VXFK D )XQG ZRXOG most 
SUREDEO\QHHGDUHYLVLRQRIWKH7UHDW\¶ (Louis, 2010:986).  
 
With a similar argument, Athanassiou (2011: 558) found Art. 7)(8µFRPSDWLEOH
with the extension of Union or Member State temporary financial assistance to Euro 
area Member States in difILFXOW\¶ (Athanassiou, 2011: 561). In his view, a literal 
interpretation of the clause indicates a prohibition of the assumption of the liabilities of 
any of the entities listed in Art. 125 but not a prohibition of a guarantee of Member 
6WDWH¶VREOLJDWLRQV (Athanassiou, 2011: 561). A teleological interpretation, he continues, 
confirms that the prohibition is unlikely to have been a blanket one because its 
indiscriminate invocation would be tantamount to disregarding the common interest in 
price stability, risking Union-wide financial and economic stability, and ignoring the 
principle of solidarity (Athanassiou, 2011: 561). Finally, in his view, a contextual 
interpretation suggests the need to make a balanced reading of the interplay between Art. 
125 and Art.  µWKH LGHD WKDW WKH QR-bailout clause must always prevail over art. 
7)(8VKRXOGEHGLVPLVVHG¶ (Athanassiou, 2011: 563-564). 
 
However, not everyone seemed to agree that the bailout mechanisms where compatible 
with the treaties. On the other side of the interpretative battlefield, not only certain 
politicians but also a number of academics insisted on the illegality of the bailouts. In 
2012, Palmstorfer offered a very critical perspective. In his view, Art. 125 had to be 
seen as a ban on the Council or Member States granting financial assistance, the 
provision being a disciplinary tool intended to make clear that governments must 
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autonomously keep national finances in order (Palmstorfer, 2012: 775-776.). He warned 
DJDLQVWµUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV¶RIWKHSURYLVLRQµWKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDW$UW 125(1) TFEU 
has to be reinterpreted. Quite the opposite is the case: as this disciplinary effect cannot 
be relied RQ WKH SURYLVLRQ DOO WKH PRUH KDV WR EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV D SURKLELWLRQ¶ 
(Palmstorfer, 2012: 777). Moreover, he rejected the idea that Art. 122(2) could act as an 
exceptiRQWRWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHµQRbailout¶ clause. In his view, Art. µKDVWREH
construed as not covering situations in which Member States ± without involving the 
Union (i.e., the Council) ± FRPH WR WKH UHVFXH RI RWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ (Palmstorfer, 
2012: 779), so that the Greek loan facility, the EFSF and the ESM would not be covered 
by such provision. Furthermore, in addition to the lack of a Commission proposal for 
these instruments, he questioned ZKHWKHUWKHH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVµEH\RQGFRQWURO¶
of the Member State concurred in the financial assistance (Palmstorfer, 2012: 781), at 
least in the cases of some debtor countries.  
 
In the same vein, for Lupo Pasini (2013: 220), the exception in Art.  µVKRXOG EH
limited to unexpected emergencies and not used to bypass the principles of 
nonintervention RI $UWLFOHV  DQG ¶ DV µD EURDG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI $UWLFOH 
7)(8ZRXOGHVVHQWLDOO\ UHQGHUPHDQLQJOHVV WKHSULQFLSOHRIQRQLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶From a 
political science perspective, Closa and Maatsch (2014: 826-827) illustrated the tension 
between legal mandates and political preferences because in their view Art.  125(1) 
7)(8 SURKLELWHG DVVLVWDQFH WR 0HPEHU 6WDWHV VR WKDW µHXUR]RQH PHPEHUV IDFHG D
dilemma. On the one hand, they could choose to stick to the provisions of the Treaty 
and refuse to provide DVVLVWDQFH « $OWHUQDWLYHO\ HXUR]RQH VWDWHV FRXOG FKRRVH WR
provide a bail-out. While this option would diminish the risk of contagion, it would also 
require bypassing EU law, either by means of a treaty reform and/or through alternative 
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legal instrumenWV¶ Furthermore, this position is found not only among English-language 
scholars. According to Wendel (2013: 27), a good number of German academics were 
of the view WKDWµDOUHDG\WKH()6)DQGWKHELODWHUDODLGVWR*UHHFHGLGQRWFRPSO\ZLWK
Article 125TFE8¶ 
 
The debates between those defending the legality of the bailouts and those defending 
their unlawfulness show that the meaning of Art. 125 TFEU had become a contested 
issue. The rule was now the object of competing scholarly interpretations whose 
implications were functional to some of the main political narratives about the crisis in 
the EU and its management.  
 
 
Constitutional amendment v. constitutional mutation: the SURFHVVRIµre-determination¶ 
of the µno bailout¶ clause 
 
According to the theory set out above, once a rule has undergone a process of de-
determination, it may become necessary to turn to legal or political mechanisms to fix 
its meaning again. The case of Art. 125 TFEU is especially useful to illustrate this 
because it provides an example of each of the procedures of disambiguation of rules that 
was described in the theory section of this article: a constitutional amendment and a 
MXGLFLDOµUH-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶RIUXOHV 
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The constitutional amendment was not carried out through the direct reform of Art. 125 
TFEU but rather indirectly through the amendment of Art. 136. A systemic 
interpretation of the interplay between the two provisions was expected to disambiguate 
WKH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH (60 DQG WKH µQR EDLORXW¶ clause of the Treaty. Apparently, 
however, the reason why political actors decided to formally amend the treaty was 
precisely the threat posed by a judicial institution: the German Federal Constitutional 
Court. According to De Witte and Beukers (2013: 810 ff.), in the view of the former 
decisions of Karlsruhe on European matters, the German government urged its 
European counterparts to amend the TFEU to provide a solid legal basis for the ESM 
that would neutralize any eventual impediment deriving from a restrictive interpretation 
of Art. 125. The treaty amendment was intended to remove ambiguities regarding the 
legality of the bailouts but did so through a formal mechanism in which the very 
wording of the law ± the signifiers ± and not merely its interpretation was modified. 
This amendment, however, took place after the Pringle ruling of the ECJ and when the 
entire process of political de-determination and judicial re-determination of Art. 125 had 
already concluded. 
 
The process of disambiguation through judicial re-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH µQR EDLORXW¶
provision was unleashed by the Irish Supreme Court, which raised the question whether 
the ESM was compatible with Art. 125 TFEU. The case had been brought before the 
Irish judiciary by the MP Mr. Thomas Pringle and was referred to the Court of Justice 
by the Irish Supreme Court through the preliminary reference mechanism. The episode 
FRQILUPHG %RXUGLHX¶V (1987: 831) observation that the juridical field converts direct 
conflict into regulated legal debate: A political battle about the bailouts was finally 
going to be settled by a court of justice following the rules of the juridical field. As 
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stated above, at this point, the amendment of Art. 136 TFEU still had not entered into 
force. For Borger (2013: 23), this put the Court of Justice in a difficult situation because 
µLW FRXOG QRW VLPSO\ VWDWH WKDW $UWLFOH  7)(8 FOHDUV WKH ZD\ IRU DVVLVWDQFH
operations that would otherwise be prohibited by the no-EDLORXWFODXVH¶ 
 
In its decision, however, the Court of Justice still IRXQGWKH(60DQGWKHµno EDLORXW¶
clause compatible because the former was considered not to diminish the incentive for 
financial probity (Craig, 2013: 280), which was deemed the main rationale of the rule. 
The ruling of the Court of Justice attacked the process of de-determination of Art. 125 
at its roots: The rule had become controversial when facing what Dworkin (1975: 1057) 
ZRXOG FDOO D µhard FDVH¶ LQ ZKLFK µWKH UHVXOW LV QRW FOHDUO\ GLFWDWHG E\ VWDWXWH RU
SUHFHGHQW¶7KLVdifficult case gave rise to contradictory interpretations of the provision. 
Pringle gave Luxembourg the chance to address the controversy by interpreting the 
meaning of Art. 125 and how it applied to the difficult case of the ESM. Although not 
everyone agreed with the interpretation of the Court of Justice (see Craig, 2013: 280-
281; Joerges, 2014:306 ff.; Wilkinson, 2015: 330), this interpretation provided a now-
uncontroversial guide to action by which all actors could safely abide. The result was 
that the ratification of the ESM was given a green light.  
 
In this regard, the legal system was ultimately capable of providing what it is expected 
to offer political actors and citizens: legal certainty, systemic coherence, and relatively 
uncontroversial guides for action. It was judicial operators who guaranteed that the 
situation of ambiguity of Art. 125 was reversed through a process of re-determination of 
the rule. In this sense, the mechanism of preliminary reference created by the European 
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legal system turned out to successfully fulfil its mission, with national higher courts and 
the Court of Justice smoothly cooperating in solving the interpretative problems 
deriving from the socially and doctrinalO\FRQWHVWHGPHDQLQJRIWKHµQREDLORXW¶FODXVH 
However, it is worth noting that the ECJ only ruled on the question posed by the Irish 
Supreme Court, as required by the very nature of Art. 267 TFEU; therefore, it is 
possible to imagine situations not clarified by this decision and in which new processes 
of disambiguation were potentially necessary. 
 
Additionally, tKH µQR EDLORXW¶ FODXVH HSLVRGH FOHDUO\ LOOXVWUDWHV WKH ULVNs posed by the 
possibility of an open judicial conflict in Europe. As is widely known, some national 
higher courts and the Court of Justice have had important disagreements regarding who 
has the final word on the interpretation of EU law, with the former insisting that in cases 
of conflict with core constitutional elements they could declare EU law non-applicable 
in their countries10. The German Federal Constitutional Court has been particularly 
UHOHYDQW LQ WKLV UHJDUG ZLWK /LQGVHWK   FDOOLQJ LW µWKH PRVW GLIILFXOW
LQWHUORFXWRU¶RIWhe European Court of Justice. The risk is obvious from the perspective 
of the theory upheld by this article. The capacity of legal systems to re-determine their 
legal rules through judicial actors is essential for them to fulfil their basic functions. 
However, processes of judicial re-determination have as a premise that there is one 
single actor whose say is final and formally accepted as binding by all other actors, even 
if some could substantially disagree with its interpretation of the controversial rule. In 
RWKHU WHUPVHYHQ LI WKHUH LVQRDJUHHPHQWRQ WKHµPHDQLQJ¶RID UXOH WKHUHVKRXOGEH
agreement that the interpretation of a rule made by a certain judicial authority should be 
                                                          
10
 See inter alia MacCormick, 1995; Kumm and Ferreres, 2005; Kumm, 2005; Lock, 2009; Komarek and 
editors, 2009; Baquero, 2008; Wendel, 2011; Davies, 2012. 
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accepted as binding by all because coherence through re-determination is a precondition 
for the correct functioning of the entire legal system. This shows the existence of a 
tension between legal certainty and constitutional pluralism that, in my view, pluralist 
authors have not yet been able to resolve11. The process of re-determination may be 
aborted if two powerful judicial actors have competing claims about ultimate 
interpretative authority, which can lead to conflicting interpretations of a rule.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The crisis that has afflicted the European Union since at least 2009 has changed the 
political and social landscape of the continent. The mechanisms of assistance created to 
address the financial difficulties in certain countries, as well as the austerity measures 
that were linked to such mechanisms, have polarized political debate in many Member 
States. This article has analyzed the political dynamics underlying the interpretation and 
application of a legal provision that turned out to play an essential role in the 
management of the crisis: Art. 125 TFEU, the so-FDOOHG µQR EDLORXW¶ FODXVH. This 
provision, whose meaning was once relatively uncontroversial, suddenly became the 
object of furious political and academic interpretative debate. While before 2009, 
academic literature on Art. 125 TFEU had been scarce, after that year, the number of 
contributions on it increased dramatically. Legal scholars, in particular, began to exhibit 
dramatically diverging interpretations about its meaning, so that the clause seemed at a 
                                                          
11
 There is a certain acknowledgment of this in the work of some pluralists. See for instance Barber, 2006: 
306. 
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certain point to have become a paradigmatic example of an indeterminate legal 
provision. Only the intervention of the Court of Justice could provide certainty. The 
decision of the Court of Justice took place in a context of dense politicization, and the 
hypothesis that this could have constrained its behaviour deserves careful consideration. 
In any case, however, this decision was able to fix the meaning of Art. 125 TFEU, thus 
providing the main actors with clear rules for action.  
 
Using the example RI WKH µQR EDLORXW¶ SURYLVLRQ, this article has sought a way to 
overcome the dichotomy determinate/indeterminate in the conceptualization of legal 
rules. This dichotomy, which underlies the traditional debates between the hegemonic 
schools of legal theory, hides under static depictions of rules the complex, dynamic 
processes through which the meanings of such rules are socially constructed and 
modified over time. Indeed, these processes are political ones. This is the case first 
because they are structured around power relations: certain actors with more juridical 
capital are considered to have a higher authority to make legitimate interpretations of 
the rules (Bourdieu, 1987: 842). Second, these processes are the result of a struggle for 
power: the power to make a certain interpretation of a rule prevail over other rival 
interpretations (Bourdieu, 1987). Finally, the catalysts RI WKH SURFHVVHV RI µGH-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶RIUXOHVDUHRIWHQ, as in the case covered by this article, political events, 
which contest the former understanding of a certain provision and foster academic 
production of scholarly interpretations on its meaning. To understand these processes, it 
is essential to combine the classic contributions of legal theory with the most recent 
developments in linguistics and with social science theories and methods. 
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 3UHFLVHO\ EHFDXVH WKH HSLVRGH RI WKH µ(XUR-EDLORXWV¶ LV MXVW RQH PRUH LQVWDQFH RI WKH
complex interactions between law and social forces, some of the core patterns found in 
the case of Art. 125 TFEU are expected to be generalizable to similar scenarios of 
contested interpretation of rules. As shown in this article, the meanings of the legal 
provisions are a political question. They are mutable and dynamic, simultaneously the 
site and the object of political competition. Ultimately, we have one more example that 
politics govern law as much as law governs politics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
References 
 
Alexander V and Anker P (1997) Fiscal Discipline and the Question of Convergence of 
National Interest Rates in the European Union. Open Economies Review 8(4):335-352. 
 
Arnold I and Lemmen J (2001) The Vulnerability of Bands to Government Default Risk 
in the EMU. International Finance 4(1):101-125. 
 
Artis MJ. (1992) The Maastricht Road to Monetary Union. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 30(3): 229-309. 
 
 Athanassiou P (2011) 2I3DVW0HDVXUHVDQG)XWXUH3ODQVIRU(XURSH¶V([LVWIURPWKH
Sovereign Debt Crisis: What Is Legally Possible (and What is Not). European Law 
Review 36(4):558-575. 
 
Baquero J (2008) The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement. 
European Law Journal 14(4):389-422.  
 
Barber NW (2006) Legal Pluralism and the European Union. European Law Journal 
12(3):306-329. 
 
Barker C and Galasinski D (2001) Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis. GB: Sage. 
 
Borger V (2013) How the Debt Crisis Exposes the Development of Solidarity in the 
Euro Area. European Constitutional Law Review 9(1):7-36. 
40 
 
 
Bourdieu P (1991) Les juristes, gardLHQVGH O¶K\SRFULVLHFROOHFWLYH ,n F Chazel and J 
Commaille (eds) Normes juridiques et regulation sociale. Paris : LGDJ, pp.95-99.  
 
Bourdieu P (1987) The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field. The 
Hastings Law Journal 38(5):805-853. 
 
Closa C and Maatsch A (2014) In a Spirit of Solidarity? Justifying the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in National Parliamentary Debates. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 52(4):826-842. 
 
Coleman J and Leitier B (1993) Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 142(2):549-637. 
 
Craig P (2013) Pringle and Use of EU Institutions outside the EU Legal Framework: 
Foundations, Procedure and Substance. European Constitutional Law Review 9(2):263-
284. 
 
Davies B (2012) Pushing Back: What Happens When Member States Resist the 
European Court of Justice? A Multi-Modal Approach to the History of European Law. 
Contemporary European History 21(3):417-435 
 
De Witte B and Beukers T (2013) Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of 
Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 
27 November 2012. Common Market Law Review 50:805-848. 
41 
 
 
Dezalay Y and Madsen MR (2012) The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu 
and the Reflexive Sociology of Law. Annual review of law and Social Science 8:435-
452 
 
Dworkin R (1975) Hard Cases. Harvard Law Review 88(6):1057-1109. 
 
Dyevre A (2010) Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: towards a general 
theory of judicial behavior. European Political Science Review 2(2):297-327. 
 
Erickson ML, Gibbs JP and Jensen GF (1977) The Deterrence Doctrine and the 
Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments. American Sociological Review 42(2):305-
317. 
 
Dyson K (2013) Sworn to Grim Necessity? Imperfection of European Economic 
Governance, Normative Political Theory and Supreme Emergency. Journal of 
European Integration 35(3):207-222. 
 
Dyson K (2010) 1RUPDQ¶V /DPHQW 7KH *UHHN DQG (XUR $UHD &ULVLV LQ +LVWRULFDO
Perspective. New Political Economy 15(4):597-608. 
 
Ehrlich E (2005[1906]) Sociología y jurisprudencia. In E Ehrlich, Escritos sobre 
Sociología y Jurisprudencia. Madrid: Marcial Pons, pp. 89-108 
 
42 
 
Ehrlich E (2005[1903]) Libre investigación del derecho y ciencia del derecho libre. In E 
Ehrlich Escritos sobre Sociología y Jurisprudencia. Madrid: Marcial Pons, pp. 53-88 
 
Fratiani M., Von Hagen J. and Waller C (1992) The Maastricht Way to EMU. Essays in 
International Finance 187. 
 
García-Villegas M (2006) Comparative Sociology of Law: Legal Fields, Legal 
Scholarships, and Social Sciences in Europe and the United States. Law & Social 
Inquiry 31(2):343-382. 
 
Greenawalt K (1990) How Law Can Be Determinate. UCLA Law Review 38(1):1-86 
 
Hart HLA (2012[1961]) The Concept of Law. GB: Oxford UP. 
 
Heller TC (1984) Structuralism and Critique. Stanford Law Review 36(1/2):127-198. 
 
Heipertz M. and Verdun A (2004) The dog that would never bite? What we can learn 
from the origins of the Stability and Growth Pact. Journal of European Public Policy 
11(5):765-780. 
 
Herdegen M (1998) Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and 
Monetary Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom. Common Market Law 
Review 35(1):9-32. 
 
43 
 
Herrman CW (2013) Pringle v. Ireland. The American Journal of International Law 
107(2):410-416.  
 
Hessel B and Mortelmans K (1993) Decentralized Government and Community Law: 
Conflicting Institutional Developments?. Common Market Law Review 30(5):905-937. 
 
Hinarejos A (2013) Fiscal Federalism in the European Union: Evolution and Future 
Choices for EMU. Common Market Law Review 50(6):1621-1642. 
 
Holmes Jr OW (1897) The Path of Law. Harvard Law Review 10, on line at 
http://www.constitution.org/lrev/owh/path_law.htm (27.08.2014). 
 
Holzmann R., Hervé Y and Demmel R (1996) The Maastricht Fiscal Criteria: Required 
but Ineffective? Empirica 23:25-58. 
 
Jeorges C (2014) The European crises and the undoing of the social and democratic 
Rechtsstaat. In JE Fossum and AJ Menéndez (eds) ARENA REPORT 2/14 - The 
European Union in Crises or the European Union as Crises?, pp. 387-491. 
 
Jettinghoff A (2004) Lawyers and European Legal Integration. Introduction to the Issue. 
In A Jettinghoff and H Schepel (eds) Special Issue of Recht der Werkelijkheid, pp. 3-14. 
 
Kelsen H (1960) Pure Theory of Law. USA: University of California Press. 
 
44 
 
Komarek J and editors (2009) 7KH&]HFK&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUW¶V6HFRQG'HFLVLRQRQWKH
Lisbon Treaty of 3 November 2009. European Constitutional Law Review 5(3):345-352.  
 
Kumm M and Ferreres V (2005) The primacy clause of the constitutional treaty and the 
future of constitutional conflict in the European Union. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 3(2-3)473:492. 
 
Kumm M (2005) The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional 
Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty. European Law Journal 
11(3):262-307. 
 
Kutz CL (1994) Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law.   
The Yale Law Journal 103(4):997-1030. 
 
La Torre M (2007) Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning: A New Paradigm for the 
Concept of Law. The Netherlands: Springer. 
 
Leitier B (1995) Legal Indeterminacy. Legal Theory 1(4):481-492. 
 
Lindseth P (2012) The Critical Promise of the New History of European Law.  
Contemporary European History 21(3):457-475. 
 
Lock T (2009) Why the European Union is Not a State. Some Critical Remarks. 
&RPPHQWV RQ WKH *HUPDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW¶s Decision on the Lisbon Treaty. 
European Constitutional Law Review 5(3):407-420. 
45 
 
 
Louis JV (2010) Guest editorial: The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages. 
Common Market Law Review 47(4):971-986. 
 
Lupo Pasini F (2013) Economic Stability and Economic Governance in the Euro Area: 
What the European Crisis can Teach on the Limits of Economic Integration. Journal of 
International Economic Law 16(1)211-256. 
 
MacCormick J (2001) Derrida on Law; Or, Poststructuralism Gets Serious. Political 
Theory 29(3)395-423. 
 
MacCormick N (1995) The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now. European Law 
Journal 1(3):259-266. 
 
Madsen MR (2011) Reflexivity and the construction of the International Object: The 
case of Human Rights. International Political Sociology 5(3):259-275. 
 
Maxeiner J (2006) Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: American legal Methods and 
the Rule of Law. Valparaiso University Law Review 41(2):517-590. 
 
Menéndez AJ (2015) Herman Heller NOW. European Law Journal 21(3):285-294. 
 
Neuhaus  PH (1963) Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Law. Law and 
Contemporary Problems 28:795-807. 
 
46 
 
Palmstorfer R (2012) To bail out or not to bail out? The current framework of financial 
assistance for euro area Member States measures against the requirements of EU 
primary law. European Law Review 37(6):771-784. 
 
Picciotto S (2015) Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of 
International Corporate Taxation. Social & Legal Studies 24(2):165-184. 
 
Scheuerman WE (1996) Legal Indeterminacy and the Origins of Nazi Legal Thought: 
The Case of Carl Schmitt. Historiy of Political Thought 17(4):571-590 
 
Schepel H and Wesseling R (1997) The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials 
and Clerks in the Writing of Europe. European Law Journal 3(2):165-188 
 
Shapiro  M (1964) Political Jurisprudence. Kentucky Law Journal 52:294-34. 
 
Snyder F (1999) EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution 
Are We Making? In P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law, pp. 439-
440. 
 
Stone Sweet A (2002) Judicialization and the Construction of Governance. In M 
Shapiro and A Stone Sweet (eds) On Law, Politics and Judicialization, pp. 55-89.  
 
Verdun A (1997) The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of the EMU: An 
Epistemic Community? Research Colloquim Series: European Integration and 
International Relations, Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, 12 Feb 1997.  
47 
 
 
Wendel M (2014) Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy: The 
German Federal ConstLWXWLRQDO&RXUW¶V2075HIHUHQFH European Constitutional Law 
Review 10(2):263-307. 
 
Wendel M Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012. 
German Law Journal 14(1): 21-52 
 
Wendel M (2011) Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives. European 
Constitutional Law Review 7(1):96-137. 
 
Wetherell M (1998) Positioning and interpretative repertoires: conversation analysis and 
post-structuralism in dialogue. Discourse and Society 9(3):387-412. 
 
Wilkinson M (2015) Authoritarian Liberalism in the European Constitutional 
Imagination: Second Time as Farce? European Law Journal 21(3):313-339. 
 
Zapf C and Moglen E (1995) Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On the 
Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein. Georgetown Law Journal 84:485-520. 
